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Abstract
The EU pursues its trade agenda with China through a web of economic and sectoral 
dialogues. We show that these dialogues do matter for wider EU trade policy. After a 
brief overview of the architecture, we map the trade-related dialogues and identify seven 
possible functions of them, giving examples of dialogues on public procurement; reforms of 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs); forced technology transfer; the protection of intellectual 
property rights; and sustainable forestry and the timber trade. The assessment seeks to 
answer four specific questions: 
i. Do dialogues improve market access? Dialogues would seem to have facilitated 
market access in a variety of ways. The EU has also insisted on reforms in China with 
a view to easing restrictions that hinder effective market access. For some aspects 
this seems to have worked, but not for the big issues, for example SOE reforms. 
ii. Can the web of dialogues be seen as an ‘unbundled’ free trade agreement (FTA)? 
The answer is, not really. The trade dialogues do not seem to substitute, even 
imperfectly, for an FTA. 
iii. Can the dialogues stimulate ‘sustainable development’? A recent convergence of EU 
and Chinese objectives has been extremely helpful for effective bilateral cooperation, 
on social matters (labour standards and social protection) and the environment 
& climate. Cooperation on energy, climate strategies and other environmental 
concerns, following dreadful neglect and indifference in China, are achieving results, 
such as better (for instance, risk-based) regulation, higher ambitions and more 
effective enforcement. 
iv. Can dialogues reconcile or at least mitigate ‘systemic’ differences? Here, dialogues 
have not proved very useful in terms of results. From the EU end, addressing systemic 
differences effectively when the partner country takes pride in enjoying a ‘socialist 
market economy with Chinese characteristics’ is intrinsically impossible. It is an 
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The EU pursues its trade agenda with China through an intricate web of economic and sectoral 
dialogues. Even though the EU conducts dialogues with many trading partners, the sheer total 
and very wide scope of EU-China dialogues render this approach unique. What is publicly known 
about these dialogues is incomplete and selective. We show that these dialogues do matter for 
wider EU trade policy. Moreover, besides traditional technical aspects of trade policy, dialogues 
have long extended to cover ‘values’ or non-trade policy objectives, including ‘sustainable 
development’. The EU and China have had dialogues on many aspects of sustainable 
development, as part of both the ‘social’ and the ‘green’ dialogues, beginning in the late 1990s.  
China and the EU have cooperated under a ‘comprehensive and strategic partnership’ since 
2003. The partnership is substantiated by an architecture of bilateral dialogues, consisting of 
three pillars – namely political, economic and sectoral, and people-to-people exchanges. By far 
the largest pillar is the economic and sectoral one, which is mostly trade related, comprising 
over 50 dialogues in various forms and intensities.  
Today’s architecture for EU-China dialogues can be traced back to a number of original 
rationales. First were early development needs and requests for policy learning. Second, some 
initial dialogues were linked to the 1985 EU-China non-preferential trade agreement. Third, was 
preparation for China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) – when the EU 
offered capacity building and support programmes. Finally, there was the persistent urge on 
both sides for China to reform deeply and structurally as China migrated out of the rigidly 
planned economy towards a market economy. Currently, the underlying rationale for having so 
many trade-relevant dialogues is that modern trade and investment policy covers a very broad 
spectrum of policy areas.  
We attempt to assess the roles and influence of these dialogues. This report presents a concise 
overview of their architecture. It then maps the trade-related dialogues, and identifies seven 
possible functions of them. In the present (shortened) report, the analysis of these functions is 
rather compact; therefore, five boxes give specific examples of dialogues to illustrate the varied 
nature, intensity and results of these arrangements. These boxes discuss public procurement, 
reforms of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), forced technology transfer, the protection of 
intellectual property rights (IPRs), and sustainable forestry and timber trade. Most of the 
report, however, is dedicated to answering four questions on the effects of these trade-related 
dialogues: i) Do dialogues improve market access? ii) Can the web of dialogues be seen as an 
‘unbundled’ free trade agreement (FTA)? iii) Can the dialogues stimulate sustainable 
development? iv) And can dialogues address ‘systemic’ differences?  
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Do dialogues improve market access? 
Dialogues have facilitated market access in a variety of ways: helping Chinese laws to align with 
WTO laws; supporting the delivery of specific WTO commitments; strengthening enforcement 
by China, including technical controls; stimulating an opening-up in specific fields (like air 
transport and maritime); and assisting China to level the playing field internally, which is also 
helpful for EU companies in China. On trade defence, there have been two dialogues but the 
EU has only further increased its restrictions, via its trade defence instrument, vis-à-vis China. 
The EU has also consistently insisted on reforms in China with a view to easing restrictions that 
hinder effective market access. In some aspects this seems to have worked, but not in the big 
issue of SOEs, for example. Notably, China’s application of the Anti-Monopoly Law to mergers 
between large SOEs is plainly anticompetitive. On forced technology transfer, dialogues failed 
to work and the EU eventually settled for filing a WTO case. On IPRs, however, dialogues and 
follow-up programmes have been quite successful – the remaining (serious) problem is 
enforcement. For geographical indications (GIs), a seven-year negotiation resulted in an EU-
China agreement in 2019, with the protection of 100 GIs on each side to begin with. On 
technical standardisation, the partners still have a dialogue on technical barriers to trade, but 
meanwhile there is also a quasi-permanent, multi-party cooperation initiative, based in Beijing, 
among CEN (European Committee for Standardisation), CENELEC (European Committee for 
Electronical Standardisation), ETSI (European Telecommunications Standards Institute), the 
European Commission and EFTA (European Free Trade Association).  
Can the web of dialogues be seen as an ‘unbundled’ FTA? 
The answer is not really. The FTA is no longer a short-run objective for the two partners and 
the EU’s two prerequisites for starting FTA talks have not been fulfilled: concluding the 
Comprehensive Agreement on Investment and deep reforms in China (bound to include a 
different approach to SOEs). The trade dialogues do not seem to substitute, even imperfectly, 
for an FTA, though the dialogue subjects coincide with a number of typical FTA chapters. 
Indeed, an eventual future FTA may be – in part – conveniently drafted based on some of the 
dialogues.  
Can the dialogues stimulate sustainable development? 
In sustainable development, a recent convergence of EU and Chinese objectives has been 
extremely helpful for effective bilateral cooperation for both the social (labour standards and 
social protection) and the environmental & climate dialogues. The EU and China have worked 
together for two or more decades on a myriad of projects, programmes, dialogues, declarations 
(also through the summits for political impetus) and via special funding. Thus, in recent energy 
cooperation the bilateral collaboration goes remarkably far; in climate strategies the EU and 
China have lately come to work closely together, but also did so in the heyday of the Clean 
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Development Mechanism.1 On other aspects of the environment dialogue, following dreadful 
neglect and indifference in China, the cooperation has achieved results, such as better (for 
instance, risk-based) regulation, higher ambitions and more effective enforcement. 
Can dialogues reconcile or at least mitigate systemic differences? 
For systemic differences, the dialogues have not proved very useful in terms of results, if indeed 
this can be expected from dialogues. It is already an accomplishment when channels of debate 
are kept open. From the EU end, dealing with systemic differences effectively when the partner 
country takes pride in enjoying a ‘socialist market economy with Chinese characteristics’ is 
intrinsically impossible. This question is so fundamental, if not existential given the 
overwhelming and highly intrusive role of the Chinese Communist Party, that one can only work 
pragmatically on the incompatibilities with the WTO and the experienced negative spillovers 
from the massive interventionism in China. These features are reflected in the EU’s China strategy 
of March 2019, in which China is regarded as a partner and a competitor as well as a rival.  
 
 
1 More specifically, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) of the Kyoto Protocol; the successful and influential 
cooperation between China and the EU on CDM investment projects is set out in detail in a box in Pelkmans (2020).  
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1. Aim and structure 
Even though the EU conducts dialogues with many trading partners, the sheer total and very 
wide scope of EU-China dialogues render this approach unique. What is publicly known about 
these dialogues is very incomplete and selective, and there is no intention on either side to 
change this more than marginally. Nevertheless, there are many signals, apart from occasional 
hard evidence, that these dialogues do matter for wider EU trade policy. Moreover, besides 
traditional technical aspects of trade policy, dialogues have long moved further still in order to 
deal with (what former EU trade commissioner Cecilia Malmstrom calls) ‘values’ or non-trade 
policy objectives, including ‘sustainable development’. Since the European Commission’s paper 
on “Trade for all” of 2015,2 non-trade policy objectives have been recognised as ‘trade relevant’ 
in the EU. The EU and China have long had dialogues on many aspects of sustainable 
development, as part of both the ‘social’ and the ‘green’ dialogues, beginning in the late 1990s.  
China and the EU have cooperated through a ‘comprehensive and strategic partnership’ since 
2003.3 The partnership is substantiated by an architecture of bilateral dialogues, consisting of 
three pillars, namely political, economic and sectoral, and people-to-people exchanges. The 
first and the last pillar together do not even add up to 15 dialogues, whereas the economic and 
sectoral pillar comprises over 50 dialogues in various forms and intensities.  
In the present CEPS report, we attempt to assess the roles and influence of these dialogues. 
Section 2 provides a brief overview of the architecture. Section 3 maps the trade-related 
dialogues, and section 4 identifies seven possible functions of them. To keep the report short, 
the analysis of these functions is rather compact. Therefore, five boxes give specific examples 
of dialogues to illustrate the varied nature and intensity of these arrangements. Most of the 
report, however, is dedicated to answering four questions on the effects of these trade-related 
dialogues, in section 5: i) Do dialogues improve market access? ii) Can the web of dialogues be 
seen as an ‘unbundled’ free trade agreement (FTA)? iii) Can the dialogues stimulate sustainable 
development? iv) And can dialogues address systemic differences? Section 6 sums up the 
conclusions.  
2. Overview of the EU-China dialogues architecture 
Mapping the EU-China dialogues is possibly useful but also complicated due to their 
proliferation over time and their organic growth without an explicit strategy or (published) 
guidelines to do so (see Box 1). Moreover, some dialogues operate without any publicity, and 
other ones with some or regular minutes or press releases.4 ‘Mapping’ is therefore a 
 
2 European Commission (2015), “Trade for all, towards a more responsible trade and investment policy”, 
Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, October (www.op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-
/publication/d90eda7c-7299-11e5-9317-01aa75ed71a1). 
3 In fact, under a ‘comprehensive partnership’ since 1998.  
4 Farnell & Crookes (2016) confirm that much of the EU-China dialogues remains unpublished. “Both sides would maintain 
that confidentiality is a precondition for a frank exchange of views and that greater transparency of these discussions might 
lead to more defensiveness” (p. 172). John Farnell is a former high official of the European Commission.  
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cumbersome exercise and certainty about the completeness of a survey remains an illusion.5 
In order to keep the overview manageable for a short report like this, we have chosen to shift 
the details to a large flowchart in the Annex. The flowchart is an adapted version of one 
published by the European External Action Service in 2015,6 which remains broadly valid to 
date. Almost a dozen new or missing dialogues have been inserted into the original flowchart 
(all in the second pillar). By slightly compressing the information about the first and third pillars, 
the focus is put on the second pillar: economic and sectoral dialogues, which suits our purpose.  
Box 1. What is a dialogue in EU-China trade relations? 
There are two ways to understand the nature of a bilateral dialogue. One is to describe what 
‘dialogues’ one can observe, the other is to appreciate why and how a dialogue avoids 
possible alternative ways of conducting diplomacy and yet seeks tangible results. In EU-China 
trade relations in a wider sense, both ways matter.  
First, one can attempt to describe dialogues in their many forms and extent of organisation, 
levels (in hierarchies), official labels and degrees of permanence. We refer to the Annex and 
Hu (2020) for more detail. In the case of EU-China, there is no FTA or customs union, so the 
typical committee structures included in such treaties do not exist. What has essentially 
happened during the last 25 years of EU-China relations in the wider trade, investment and 
economic domains is that a dialogue is initiated when the two parties see a need or 
opportunity. In some specific cases, the dialogues have intensified and eventually 
transformed into legal negotiations preparing for formal agreements or treaties (e.g. on 
customs cooperation, geographical indications, maritime and air transport, and the 
Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) on which negotiations are still ongoing). 
Dialogues can be ‘high level’ or not (which does not say much in actual practice), regular (if 
not annual) or not, linked to technical and practical programmes or projects of all kinds (some 
of which have been very substantial). Diplomatic wording may matter. For example, by 
renaming a dialogue and giving the bilateral work a beautiful label (e.g. the Blue Partnership), 
by delegating sensitive issues to working groups (for instance, on illegal, unreported and 
unregulated fishing, on World Trade Organization (WTO) reform or on technical rail issues), 
or by organising the work as a bilateral cooperation mechanism as in the timber trade, the 
overall dialogue is not damaged too much. 
Second, dialogues often begin as typical testing grounds, not legal obligations or rigid 
frameworks. Indeed, many countries may first seek dialogues and not be interested in ‘hard’ 
agreements. This is even more true for China, as its long traditions are rooted in relational 
commitments (often) more than hard legal obligations, which may be perceived as 
hampering as much as helping, since relationship could be unreliable especially when conflict 
with national interest arises. Also, trust has to be built up and this is best done in loose 
frameworks, without too many binding obligations. Moreover, since 2001 China and the EU 
have both been bound by WTO law and China in addition by its Protocol of Accession to the 
WTO (with some additional obligations), so the bilateral dialogues need not be burdened by 
these legal issues. The term ‘dialogues’ and their practice thus far express this more 
 
5 As is clear from the survey in Hu (2020). 
6 See https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/2015_november_eu-china_dialogue_architecture.jpg.  
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diplomatic and relational approach very well. More importantly, more often than not in EU-
China trade and investment relations in a wide sense, it is the combination of confidential 
discussions and debate without much or any public detail (e.g. a press release or more) that 
is regarded as helpful or the least-hindering diplomatic relations when seeking pragmatic 
results. The conviction – strong in the OECD world and some other countries – that dialogues 
are not so convincing because they lack hard obligations, is not necessarily wrong in some 
cases. However, the pursuit of hard obligations in trade, investment and, e.g. sustainable 
development, changes the nature of discussions and might fail or remain very modest for 
that very reason, whereas EU-China dialogues have accomplished a considerable list of 
results due to pragmatic cooperation.  
The second pillar of the bilateral dialogue architecture is extremely rich and varied. It comprises 
a wide set of typical trade policy issues, notably:  
• consultation on technical barriers to trade (TBT);  
• trade defence measures (certainly with China);  
• customs issues;  
• a range of regulatory trade issues that all have dialogues and/or working groups;  
• specialised sectoral dialogues (from competition policy and industrial products to 
science & technology, sustainable tourism and the dialogue on food safety); 
• several dialogues on ocean affairs (later: the Blue Partnership), on fisheries and on the 
Law of the Sea & Polar affairs,  
• a bilateral cooperation mechanism on sustainable forestry & trade (based on the EU 
FLEGT initiative on forest law enforcement, governance and trade);  
• several initiatives and dialogues under the Climate Change Partnership (including the 
low-carbon economy, smart city and circular economy); and the ambitious Energy 
Roadmap of 2016, which is full of actions. 
In addition are dialogues on state aid control, the Legal Dialogue and the one about, and with, small 
and medium-sized enterprises. A number of these dialogues have spawned important working 
groups, like those on the market economy status, on WTO reforms and on illegal, unreported and 
unregulated fishing, as well as, for example, the specialised Railway Working Group.  
Deliverables from dialogues are summarised in the annual China-EU summit, which also 
announces the respective work programmes for the next steps. The many implementing 
projects pursuing the different objectives of dialogues render the bilateral, comprehensive 
strategic partnership concrete and substantive. The summit, in turn, supports the dialogues 
with political blessing, and resumes personal contacts among the leaders and their cabinet 
members, which is important for building trust.  
‘Below’ the summit, there are several very broad high-level dialogues involving the Commission 
vice president and China’s vice premier, supported in turn by meetings of top officials. A special 
case is the bilateral Connectivity Platform prompted by the Belt and Road Initiative, only 
launched in 2015, which is conducted at the political level and with working group meetings 
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among experts.7 The same format is applied by many economic and sectoral dialogues, from 
the High-Level Economic and Trade Dialogue to the Dialogue on Food Safety, which is 
conducted between specialised departments as well as working parties and committees. Some 
dialogues are conducted at both political and working party levels simultaneously.  
Overall, it would seem that the entire ‘conglomerate’ of dialogues is highly decentralised, 
where form is a function of substance and the variable demand for detail. Still, it must be borne 
in mind that, especially on trade relations, the overall cooperation between the EU and China 
was designed to be open and broad, ever since the 1985 Trade and Economic Cooperation 
Agreement. Such a relationship was intended to not exclude any subjects of economic 
cooperation as long as they fell within the (then) competence of the European Economic 
Community (Article 10).  
3. Trade-related EU-China dialogues  
Given the large number of economic and sectoral dialogues, it is necessary to first identify 
which dialogues are ‘trade related’ or indeed ‘trade-policy related’.  
Figure 1. Trade relevance of EU-China dialogues 
Strategic 
• High Level Econ & Trade Dialogues  
Direct trade-relevant dialogues 
• Joint customs cooperation (agreement) 
• Industrial products & WTO /TBT 
• Pharma & medical devices 
• IPRs, incl. GI, & enforcement 
• TDI best practices WG 
• ICT/ Telecoms Dialogues 
• Agricultural Dialogues 
• Fisheries Dialogues 
• Dialogue on consumer products (safety) 
• Animal health dialogue (MOU) 
• Trade & Investment Dialogue 
• Economic / Trade WG 
• Market-economy status WG 
• High-level Transport Dialogue 
• Dialogue on Food Safety / SPS  
• Maritime Transport (Agreement) 
• Reg. dialogue on Public Procurement 
• Ocean Affairs (Blue Partnership) 
• Law of the Sea & Polar affairs 
• BCM on sustainable forestry & trade 
• EU/China WG on IUU 
• EU/China WG on WTO Reform 
Other trade-relevant dialogues 
• Competition policy dialogue 
• Railway WG 
• Labour, employment, social affairs dialogue 
• Industrial sectors dialogue / consultation 
• Drug precursors Joint follow-up WG 
• Energy Security (Declaration) & Energy 
Roadmap 
• Climate Change Partnership 
• Environmental Policy Dialogues 
• Electricity market Dialogue 
• H & S (occ. HS) Dialogue 
• Sustainable Tourism [Mode 2, GATS] 
• State-aids control 
Other economic dialogues 
• 12 X might be trade-relevant (e.g. macro-
economic; High-level dial. on Innovation 
Cooperation; High-tech sectors; Science & 
Technology; Legal/rule-of-law; Low Carbon 
economy; SME policy; Health) 
• 8X non-trade (e.g. urbanization; High-level Dial. 
on Circular Economy; smart city) 
Connectivity Platform 
 
Source: “EU-China Dialogue Architecture”, European External Action Service, November (2015) and authors’ compilation. 
 
7 See the projects presented under the EU-China Connectivity Platform (https://ec.europa.eu/transport/themes/ 
international/eu-china-connectivity-platform_en). 
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In Figure 1 we distinguish between directly trade-relevant and indirectly trade-relevant 
dialogues, allowing yet another category comprising 12 dialogues that might at times be trade 
relevant, besides the special Connectivity Platform which surely is trade relevant (but heavily 
oriented towards infrastructure).  
No fewer than 22 dialogues are directly trade relevant and another 12 have indirect trade 
relevance.8 In addition, another 12 of the 20 remaining economic dialogues might have trade 
relevance on occasion, such as the macroeconomic dialogue, the one on high-tech sectors, the 
legal one (e.g. on the rule of law) and the low-carbon economy. Altogether, this adds up to 46. 
And there is the increasingly important Connectivity Platform with its emphasis on 
infrastructure (rail, air, road and digital connectivity), technical standards, customs facilitation 
and regulatory issues which dictate that the operation of the Belt and Road Initiative in the EU 
must respect the single market rules.9 In short, there is a widespread bilateral ‘web’ of EU-
China dialogues, including some that would not always be considered part of trade policy but 
which matter for bilateral and multilateral trade and investment.  
4. Functions of EU-China trade dialogues  
The difficulty in mapping the EU-China dialogues is that, through organic growth, dialogues may 
generate new dialogues when, for example, the importance or coverage of a single issue 
increases so much that it might engender other new dialogues in their own right. Such organic 
development can take place across the various competences of the directorate-generals at the 
Commission, and the whole structure appears complicated. Nevertheless, it seems possible to 
identify no fewer than seven functions of the dialogues, as summarised in Table 1.  
Table 1. Seven functions of EU-China trade dialogues  
1.  Exchange of information, better understanding and mutual (policy) learning 
2.  Capacity building 
 2.1 Project-based activities to tackle challenges and for mutual learning 
 2.2 Exchange of staff & close cooperation between agencies/services 
 2.3 Capacity building & implementation support 
3.  Trade policy-related consultations, pre-negotiations and coordination for international fora 
 3.1 Joint efforts/’undertakings’ in multilateral/international cooperation 
 3.2 Technical consultation on (many) bilateral trade & investment aspects 
 3.3 Identifying solutions to issues of mutual interest, e.g. preparing technical negotiations 
or agreeing on memoranda of understanding 
Source: authors’ compilation. 
 
8 We recognise that this distinction is not always sharp to draw.  
9 See Blockmans & Hu (2019). 
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Table 1 is to be read keeping in mind the enormous changes in the economic, social, legal, 
institutional and technical capabilities of China over the (say) 25 years of the dialogue process. 
One prominent difference between the 1990s and today is that the EU and China have neither 
a donor-recipient nor a mentor-disciple relationship, but a multifaceted partnership10 between 
two mature economies as equal partners. Moreover, China’s capacity in legislation and 
technicality of requirements has made tremendous progress over the past decades, indeed so 
much so that the country has much to offer for the EU to learn. The contrast over time matters 
when inspecting the three main functions under item 2. However, this does not mean that 
functions under item 2 are no longer exercised. Under item 2.1, for example, funding is 
nowadays often provided by both the EU and China. Joint agenda-setting has also become more 
of a common practice, though China would prefer to be able to exert more influence on this. 
Not only has China changed over time, but also the EU has – though less spectacularly – 
whether in policy priorities or in deepening or improving a range of policies relevant to trade 
and investment.  
Based on Hu (2020), it is instructive to look at some examples under the various items in Table 
1. Under item 1 (exchange of information), a permanent feature is domestic reforms in China. 
China and the EU have cooperated on many different domestic reforms for over two decades.  
Box 2. Regulatory Dialogue on Public Procurement 
It was only in 2000 that China enacted its public procurement laws, in order to qualify for 
WTO membership. Prior to that, public procurement activities were ‘centrally planned’ and 
had little relevance to trade. They were also closely linked to state-owned enterprises. Given 
the nature of China’s interventionist traditions even after central planning was given up, 
open and transparent public procurement has proven to be a difficult issue to tackle. 
Traditionally, public procurement has not been a trade issue for China, perhaps not even a 
‘market’ issue, but a problem of public finance whereby the use of public funds would trigger 
the application of the public procurement rules. Such rules and their supervision would 
minimise corruption and adverse choices as well as reduce the waste of public money.  
In any case, in 2006, a year before China submitted its initial GPA11 accession offer to the 
WTO, the Regulatory Dialogue on Public Procurement was set up between China’s Ministry 
of Finance and the DG Markt of the European Commission. The dialogue has the mandate to 
serve as a forum for policy consultation and discussion, in order to enhance technical 
expertise and capability in the area of government procurement policy at China’s Ministry of 
Finance. The dialogue was expected to increase mutual understanding and awareness of 
current and forthcoming policy approaches, legislation and related issues, both in China and 
in the EU. According to the mandate in details, the dialogue identifies mutual interest, which 
 
10 In “EU-China – A strategic outlook”, the EU describes China as “a cooperation partner with whom the EU has 
closely aligned objectives, a negotiation partner with whom the EU needs to find a balance of interests, an 
economic competitor in the pursuit of technological leadership, and a systemic rival promoting alternative models 
of governance.” See EU-China – A strategic outlook, JOIN(2019) 5 final, Strasbourg, 12 March.  
11 The WTO Government Procurement Agreement, which China has committed to join. 
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enables China and the EU to share their experiences and follow new developments in 
legislation and enforcement of domestic government procurement rules (including the use 
of electronic procurement) and in international fora such as the WTO GPA. To achieve these 
objectives, the overall dialogue format consists of regulatory dialogue, seminars and joint 
studies to explore solutions in order for China to accede to the GPA in an expeditious manner.  
Though China’s seventh offer submitted in October 2019 was still considered inadequate 
because in a number of critical areas (including thresholds, entity coverage and exclusions), 
the professed openness was still not commensurate with what GPA parties offered,12 in 
recent years a number of procurement methods have been adopted by China. One such is 
e-procurement, probably inspired by the EU’s e-procurement strategy, which has been 
emerging since 2012. This progress is a great leap forward given the historical background 
of China’s public procurement regime, which was a confidential subject accessible only 
within the governmental establishments, also in relation to the enhanced accountability of 
the government to its people.  
Essentially, a spirit of transparency is being introduced in government expenditures while in 
the past it was strictly kept within government, a legacy of a centrally planned economy. 
Along with the introduction of e-procurement methods, government procurement 
opportunities at different administrative levels are now streamlined and listed on a website. 
E-procurement has also brought public scrutiny to public procurement, breaking down the 
secrecy around it and thereby helping to eliminate possible nepotism and corruption. China 
has also implemented the public-private partnership model for better efficiency when using 
public funds and when executing larger, complex procurement contracts of longer duration 
(e.g. maintaining a toll road for two decades or running a metro system, as a Hong Kong 
company does in Beijing). This is a remarkable development: public procurement is now 
open for public scrutiny, including judicial review, and the private sector is eligible to 
participate. As a result, the government has relinquished some of its administrative power, 
including that of monopoly. The EU has contributed much expertise and influence to this 
revolutionary process of modernisation of China’s public procurement regime through the 
dialogue platform.13 
 
Under item 2, intense and sustained activity in many areas has been reported. Examples under 
2.1 include mutual access to funding, publications and research under the High-level Dialogue 
on Innovation Cooperation; a big and diversified programme of capacity building called the 
China-EU Trade Project; the opening of the China Window in the Erasmus Mundus programme; 
and early common initiatives in higher education leading to the establishment of the China-
Europe International Business School and the Europe-China Law School. Item 2.2 (personnel 
exchanges) was an exercise more often used in the early days of bilateral cooperation. For 
 
12 See the United States Trade Representative (2020), “2019 Report to Congress on China’s WTO Compliance”, 
United States Trade Representative, Washington, D.C., p. 38.  
13 See Pelkmans & Hu, et al. (2018), Tomorrow’s Silk Road, Assessing an EU-China Free Trade Agreement, Rowman 
& Littlefield (2nd ed.), pp. 157; 293-9. 
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example, secondment took place between China’s national intellectual property office and the 
European Patent Office. Between the Commission’s DG Trade and its Chinese counterpart 
MOFCOM, one famous intern was Wang Shouwen, presently vice trade minister and China’s 
deputy international trade representative. With respect to item 2.3 (capacity building and so 
on), one can mention a successful chain of programmes on intellectual property rights (IPRs) 
(since 2004, including working group meetings with stakeholders), detailed technical support 
and training for verification and control of animal diseases in many Chinese harbours, direct 
collaboration between EU and Chinese consumer protection authorities on the safety of 
consumer goods imported from China,14 and highly specific implementation support for 
customs followed by more intensified cooperation (and a customs agreement). Such intensified 
cooperation involved, for example, the improvement of supply chain security and facilitation 
for reliable traders. The mechanism of smart and secure trade lanes was launched in 2006 in 
order to test the security measures applied to shipments and containers throughout the 
journey. Customs cooperation also covered the facilitation of better data exchange as well as 
mutual recognition on key customs issues.  
Under item 3 of Table 1 (which includes identifying solutions to challenges), activity has 
increased significantly over time, ever since China’s membership of the WTO and even more so 
since China’s economic strength has grown and the country has become a leading world trader. 
As far as the common efforts on international cooperation are concerned (3.1), examples are 
the joint long-run support of ITER (the nuclear fusion project) now established in France, the 
bilateral Working Group on WTO reform initiated in 2018, the sensitive collaboration with China 
in the Global Forum on Steel (though China quit the Forum in autumn 2019)15 and close 
cooperation in the run-up to the 2015 Paris Agreement on Climate Change and in the Climate 
Change Partnership. As far as item 3.2 (technical consultations on specifics of trade policy in 
the wider sense) is concerned, many of the often highly technical subjects in Figure 1 marked 
as having “direct trade relevance” can be mentioned. Of course, it is known that the 
preparations for negotiations do not always work out, as for instance is the case with the 
‘market economy’ status under EU trade defence.16  
 
14 This is linked to the RAPEX alert system, fed by the EU and its member states. Risky products are traced back to 
Chinese producers with the help of the authorities and remedies are proposed.  
15 It should be noted that, according to the OECD Economic Survey of China (2019, p. 15), China’s steel production 
capacity decreased by just a modest 9.8% over 2014-17.  
16 And since, by virtue of Section 15(d) of its WTO Accession Protocol, China was not confirmed as a market 
economy by the EU. Because the old methodology for dumping margin calculations expired 15 years after China’s 
WTO accession, in December 2017, the EU updated its methodology by using undistorted benchmarks to 
determine the 'normal value' of the product. This applies to all WTO members where “significant market 
distortions” are found. In other words, the notions of a market or non-market economy are no longer employed. 
What is relevant is evidence on ‘significant distortions’. The new regulation has not been recognised by China as 
WTO-consistent and a formal complaint was lodged to the WTO Dispute Settlement Body. China’s complaints 
focused on the new methodology that the EU has introduced pertaining to the determination of normal value for 
“non-market economy” countries in anti-dumping proceedings involving products from China. A panel was 
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5. Queries about the effects of trade-related dialogues  
An assessment of the usefulness of EU-China dialogues remains difficult because there is 
insufficient (hard and verifiable) information and officials on both sides are not forthcoming – 
retreating into diplomatic parlance that remains vague – or are outright silent. The following 
discussion is based on painstaking research but we are conscious of what we do not know at 
this stage and are painfully aware of subjects for which there seems to be no way of knowing. 
Given the great importance of EU-China trade and investment relations, also in the wider sense 
(i.e. including sustainable development), we have nonetheless pursued this work in earnest. 
We pose four questions about the actual or possible effects of these dialogues and answer 
them to the best of our ability and information.  
5.1 Do dialogues improve market access? 
5.1.1 The general picture  
Here the picture would seem to be mixed and requires careful discussion. Given the many 
functions of dialogues, some have (over time) been helpful in at least five ways. First, dialogues 
have contributed to aligning domestic laws in China with WTO rules, and, more importantly, 
helped to enable the delivery of China’s WTO commitments on trade and investment. Examples 
include IPRs, competition law and the law on technical standardisation. Second, they have 
helped to strengthen enforcement, sometimes in a very concrete and ‘hands-on’ fashion (e.g. 
the close cooperation by EU and Chinese consumer protection authorities to trace producers 
of overly risky goods and to approach them). Third, the EU has helped to bolster various types 
of technical controls or supported their convergence with international practices and/or make 
them identical within the large Chinese market (e.g. in harbours) so as to level the playing field. 
This has been particularly the case with sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) types of controls, 
which is surely one driver of the rapid increase in EU food exports to China over the years. 
Fourth, dialogues have helped or stimulated an opening-up in specific fields, notably in air 
transport and to a lesser extent in maritime transport. Fifth, in some cases, the EU has used 
dialogues to stimulate Chinese authorities to reduce intra-Chinese market fragmentation and 
uncertainty. This exercise is especially useful to help China level domestic markets after certain 
monopolies of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were abolished, and the commercial roles of 
multi-layered administration in the markets were (supposed to be) relinquished. The 
establishment of a new market system was imperative, but not necessarily equal or equivalent 
in the various provinces.  
 
subsequently established. Nonetheless, on 7 May 2019, the panel received a request from China to suspend the 
panel’s work in the proceedings on European Union – Measures related to Price Comparison Methodologies 
(WT/DS516), until further notice. More recently, the EU has intensified pressure, holding essentially that China 
causes ‘systemic trade issues’ that have to be addressed urgently. See also Pelkmans (2018) for an analysis of the 
systemic trade issues with China.  
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5.1.2 Tariffs and tariff-rate quotas are dealt with in Geneva 
Classical market access with the help of duties17 levied at the border is of course not the subject 
of EU-China dialogues. A number of dialogues had as their initial purpose to assist China in 
delivering its WTO commitments, and to support a smooth transit from a centrally planned to 
a market economy.18 Tariffs and tariff-rate quotas are left to the WTO agreements or to 
eventual FTA negotiations, not to dialogues. Also, given China’s active unilateral (applied) tariff 
policy, as set out in some detail in Pelkmans & Hu, et al. (2018), any attempt to improve market 
access via EU-China dialogues in other ways is bound to remain at best very partial and its 
effectiveness for EU exporters a priori unclear. Since market access to China is, on the whole, 
far more restricted than Chinese access to the EU,19 the dialogues cannot but be a weak and 
questionable instrument for this purpose. Moreover, despite China’s efforts in eliminating 
market access barriers as seen from its Foreign Investment Law (which came into force in 
January 2020), there are still numerous Chinese restrictions on incoming foreign direct 
investment (FDI) and the post-establishment business options, again something that Chinese 
FDI in the EU hardly encounters as the EU regime is among the most liberal in the world 
according to the OECD FDI restrictiveness index.  
Market access is also influenced by trade defence measures. It should be noted (see Figure 1) 
that two closely related topics used to have their own EU-China dialogues: trade defence such 
as anti-dumping and countervailing duties,20 and the ‘market economy status’. For China, there 
can be no doubt that EU trade defence has been a serious problem for at least a decade or 
more, even when the total trade value affected is barely more than 1% of bilateral goods trade. 
In the period 1995-2014, China was targeted by the EU for anti-dumping case initiations for on 
average some 28% – the highest share among trading partners – but (when taking anti-dumping 
measures in force) the Chinese share of all anti-dumping measures of the EU quickly rose after 
2001 to reach 47% in 2014.21 In 2018, however, the share of anti-dumping measures in force 
hitting Chinese exporters to the EU (as a percentage of all measures for all trading partners) 
reached an extremely high 71% (85 of 120),22 in part due to the steel crisis in China. At the 
plurilateral level, this was also addressed in the Global Forum on Steel. Additional sensitivity 
 
17 Or tariff rate quotas in agriculture. 
18 Although it might be discussed at the highest level dialogues, but this is not reported.  
19 See for detail in many aspects of tariffs and regulation, Pelkmans et al. (2018), op. cit. 
20 Safeguard measures also fall under trade defence but these are very rare in the EU (in contrast to the US).  
21 See Pelkmans et al. (2018), op. cit., p. 80. See also Yalcin et al. (2016). In numbers, the US and India had even 
more anti-dumping cases against China in force at the time.  
22 See European Commission (2019), Annex O, 37th Annual Report from the Commission to the Council and the 
European Parliament on the EU's anti-dumping, anti-subsidy and safeguard activities and the use of trade defence 
instruments by third countries targeting the EU in 2018, SWD(2019) 141, 29 March (www.trade.ec.europa.eu/ 
doclib/docs/march/tradoc_157811.pdf). The 38th EU anti-dumping report (of April 2020) shows that this extreme 
focus on China has stayed the same: 86 measures of a total of 121. See European Commission (2020), Annex O, 
38th Annual Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the EU's anti-dumping, 
anti-subsidy and safeguard activities and the use of trade defence instruments by third countries targeting the EU 
in 2019, SWD(2020) 71, 30 April (www.trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2020/may/tradoc_158734.PDF).  
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emerged because China had firmly counted on the ‘market economy status’ clause in EU anti-
dumping being removed, as legally required by the WTO Accession Protocol, by December 
2016. This cannot be discussed in the present context but the practical effect of this clause 
(more precisely, when market economy status would not be granted in an anti-dumping case) 
was that the anti-dumping duties imposed by the EU would tend to be some 15-20% higher. 
The EU replaced this clause with a reform in which market-based comparison of relevant prices 
would not be accepted for purposes of anti-dumping cases if export companies operate from 
an economy with ‘significant distortions’. A special EU-China dialogue was established to enable 
extensive bilateral discussions but as far as we know, to little avail.23  
5.1.3 Market access as a result of reforms 
‘Effective market access’ was attempted in other dialogues with, so it seems, modest success. 
The Chinese reforms that the EU has typically been interested in tend to have the effect of 
facilitating effective market access in various ways. Many of these issues are complex and 
cannot possibly be dealt with here in an analytically satisfactory fashion. The crux has often 
been to render sectors or interventions more ‘market oriented’ (e.g. with fewer restrictions on 
services), thereby facilitating ‘ordinary’ competition within China between foreign companies 
and local ones, whether SOEs or private firms. Although the fewer-restrictions approach has 
worked to some degree, be it at a slow pace, it cannot easily be attributed to EU-China dialogues 
as such. Rather, the dialogues may have stimulated debates within the Chinese government and 
helped the government overcome resistance from protected companies, not seldomly SOEs. The 
EU has also tried to suggest alternative solutions that would be less or not restrictive. Another 
permanent reform issue in dialogues has been the EU’s insistence on removing the privileges for 
certain Chinese SOEs. In doing so, effective market access in a range of sectors would surely 
improve (e.g. banking and insurance). But there is little doubt that one of the major systemic 
differences between China and market economies is precisely found here. As a consequence, 
China has been anything but forthcoming on this ‘reform issue’ even in informal dialogues.  
Box 3. SOE reforms 
Since 2013, with President Xi Jinping in charge, SOEs have become more important and have 
received increasing support. Two major examples demonstrate this. One is that SASAC (for 
central-level non-financial SOEs) and Central Huijin (for financial institutions) act as 
regulators, investors and operators. As Lardy (2019) has shown, the increased support to 
SOEs clearly is at the cost of loans extended to private firms. Whereas the share of loans (for 
non-financial enterprises) provided to private firms in China fell from an average of some 52% 
over the years 2010-13 to a mere 11% in 2016, that to SOEs shot up from 35% in 2013 to no 
less than 83% in 2016. No wonder the rate of investment of SOEs reacted with a rise (after a 
delay of two years) from 32% in 2015 to 37% in 2017. Also, the growth of Chinese industrial 
 
23 As noted, China filed a WTO case against the EU in the light of some clauses in the new EU regulation. See 
footnote 17.  
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output attributable to SOEs (which had fallen to a very low rate of 2% by 2015!) showed a 
hike to 7% by mid-2018.24 
The other example is found in Chinese competition policy. China’s Anti-Monopoly Law of 
2007 takes EU competition law as its main reference point, as the Anti-Monopoly Law 
regulates against anti-competitive agreements, abuse of dominant position and 
concentration, which are echoes of Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union and the EU’s Merger Regulation. This is a result of intense collaboration 
under joint projects and an active dialogue of the kinds specified in Table 1 as 2.1 and 2.3. 
But these rules are not applied to SOEs, especially not when mergers are at stake. It is well 
known that SOEs are far less profitable than private Chinese companies. Some SOEs are 
‘zombies’, which could not persist in a competitive market economy. Such SOEs typically 
never die but are kept afloat with ‘actionable subsidies’ possibly (according to the WTO 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures) and other special arrangements. 
Eventually, these SOEs are forced to merge with other SOEs. The notion that either they die 
(possibly with a good social plan) or are bought up by private enterprises (whether Chinese 
or foreign) and restructured, is so far alien to the Chinese regime. In a period of barely two 
years, SASAC listed no fewer than 12 bilateral mergers, all of large to very large SOEs.25 Not 
only does this practice violate core principles of a market economy, it also ignores the very 
essence of the Anti-Monopoly Law and may well create or strengthen dominance, a leading 
reason to forbid or condition the merger. There is a considerable risk that formal entry, when 
liberalised, cannot be exploited by EU enterprises in the Chinese market in the presence of 
so much market power.  
These features show in no uncertain terms that, despite the significant influence the EU has 
had on Chinese competition law and its officials, the dialogue has proved futile in the face of 
a determined regime eager to bolster the role of SOEs in China.  
 
Yet another reform strongly and repeatedly advocated by the EU is about various aspects of 
investment access and, more generally, about extending ‘national treatment’ to EU (or foreign) 
investors. Here the EU business community in China – usually prudent – began to complain 
aloud about what was called the Chinese fairytale of ‘unfulfilled promises’. In the Boao Forum 
for Asia of 2018, President Xi promised once again that national treatment would be extended 
to all foreign investors. Only in the April 2019 EU-China summit, however, was this promise 
becoming more concrete in the framework of the CAI negotiations. If the CAI were to be 
concluded and ratified, it would surely be a monumental achievement. No other country (e.g. 
the US began such negotiations five years earlier, but were then suspended) has so far 
accomplished this. Since the EU is a major player, one may regard this possible success as a 
firmer change towards greater market orientation, but at present this is still speculative.  
 
24 Growth of industrial output attributable to private firms fell almost linearly from 25% in 2005 to 7% in 2018.  
25 See www.sasac.gov.cn and Lardy (2019) for details; the period referred to is June 2015 to August 2017.  
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Box 4. Forced technology transfer 
There is much talk and indeed considerable policy friction about China’s tactics of forced 
technology transfer for (e.g. EU) companies interested in investing in China. But we view this 
as more of an investment issue, and with regard also to IPR protection and parties’ freedom 
of contract. Ever since the early days of China’s opening-up, the mentality of Chinese officials 
has been to seek ‘deals’ in the ‘market for technology’. Examples include foreign companies’ 
parting with technology in exchange for market access in China and using technology transfer 
in exchange for favourable treatment like reduced fees for land leasing or a waiver of utility 
charges (this does not mean that Chinese companies do not pay for new technologies, China 
is in fact one of the world’s biggest payers for technologies. China paid €30.80 billion for 
licensing fees and royalties for the use of IP in 2019).26  
These tactics were detected long ago and according to China’s WTO Accession Protocol, 
China pledged to eliminate or bring into conformity with the WTO agreement all special trade 
arrangements, including barter trade arrangements as specified in the protocol.27 In Annex 1 
of the Protocol, China pledged to abolish technology transfer requirements in order to 
comply with the WTO Agreement on Trade-related Investment Measures (TRIMs), but that is 
only with regard to trade in goods. At the same time, for example, the subsidies provided for 
preferential income tax treatment to enterprises transferring technologies must be notified 
in accordance with Article 25 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties.28 The 
EU (with Japan) at long last joined the US in its complaint, China — Certain Measures 
Concerning the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights (DS542), which was eventually 
submitted to the WTO in March 2018.29 The EU also lodged its own complaint against China 
on forced technology transfer.30 Since the Sino-America trade war started, China has made 
attempts to rectify the bad practice, as seen in its new Foreign Investment Law (Article 24). 
It is also addressed in the US-China Economic and Trade Agreement of January 2020.  
 
A range of other reforms possibly stimulated and helped by EU-China dialogues consists of 
more technical reforms that nonetheless are critical for ‘effective market access’. Two 
important examples include technical standardisation and IPRs. As described in some detail in 
Pelkmans & Hu, et al. (2018, ch. 9), the Chinese technical standardisation system initially 
suffered from path dependency going back to the days of mandatory planning in a closed 
economy. This was increasingly at odds with the requirements of a modern and far more open 
market economy, for both imports and exports of goods (and, at first, especially for 
 
26 State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE), International trade in goods and services of China (02.2020) 
(http://www.safe.gov.cn/en/2019/0926/1568.html). 
27 See Accession of the People’s Republic of China, WTO, WT/L/432, 23 November 2001, at p. 4. 
28 See Annex 5, Accession of the People’s Republic of China, WTO, WT/L/432, 23 November 2001.  
29 Though based on the two communications from the chairperson of the panel dated 3 March and 8 June 2020, 
due to consecutive requests by the US to suspend the proceeding of the panel in light of its ongoing consultations 
with China, the proceeding has been suspended.  
30 China — Certain Measures on the Transfer of Technology, DS 549. 
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intermediates). Also, the swiftly rising level of technology in China and the exports of medium- 
and high-tech goods created a strong demand for conformity assessment based on world 
standards, or at least on technical standards from the US bodies and from the EU system based 
on the new approach and on harmonisation. One form of path dependency entailed a myriad 
of ministries and agencies having a partial say on some forms of standardisation, while at the 
same time companies formally having no right to standardise. Indeed, conventional market-
driven (private) standardisation bodies as referred to in the annex of the WTO TBT Agreement 
do not exist in China.  
In 2015, China finally embarked on a thorough reform of the standardisation system, 
overhauling the incredible complexity and cutting overlaps, while allowing some freedom for 
enterprises. In 2017, a new standardisation law was adopted. The EU has worked with China 
through a dialogue and with a local representation of CEN/CENELEC/ETSI (also funded by the 
Commission) in Beijing since 2014. China has gradually become more open to consultation with 
foreign business in the case of numerous standardisation plans; it has also announced its 
intention to become more active in ISO/IEC, helping to write world standards, again strongly 
advocated by the EU. Still, it has not stimulated the establishment of ‘private standard-setting 
bodies’ as defined in the TBT Annex. In other words, standards are still very much state affairs, 
be it in a more open and rational framework.  
One of the most successful dialogues with China for decades is the one on IPRs (Pelkmans et 
al., 2018, ch. 13; Hu, 2018) as explained in Box 5.  
Box 5. IPR protection 
After an initial focus on IPR laws and implementation, including geographical indications (GIs), 
the emphasis has recently shifted to enforcement via special IPR courts (now functioning in 
several important cities in China) and technical support in the fight against counterfeiting. 
That fight is a huge problem still today, with the EU (and its business) suffering major damage 
every year simply because Europe is the commercial leader in most of the (luxury) product 
sectors typically suffering from counterfeiting. Less known is that counterfeiting is a huge 
issue also within China and a lot of litigation takes place. For the EU, of all the counterfeiting 
discovered at EU borders no less than 56% originates directly from China and several indirect 
routes probably add another 10% or more. It is estimated that 12.5% of all goods trade from 
China consists of counterfeited goods!31 Therefore, despite the active and systematic 
approach and support through the IPR dialogue, successful in helping China’s law-making and 
enforcement strategies, one can nevertheless argue that the results of the IPR dialogue are 
mixed. This is because of the continued failure to come to grips with the massive violation of 
IPRs in goods trade and within China (also a major problem for EU companies selling there).  
But on the other hand, for instance, China has adopted the EU’s sui generis GI protection 
scheme. The conclusion of the bilateral GI protection and cooperation agreement at the end 
 
31 See European Commission (2018), Report on the EU customs enforcement of intellectual property rights: Results 
at the EU border, DG Taxation and Customs Union 2018, Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union.  
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of 2019 will further boost the EU’s agri-food exports to China, now the EU’s second largest 
agriculture export market after the US, and the export volume is continuously growing. And 
China is the EU’s 5th source of imports of agriculture and fisheries (Hu, 2018). Indeed, one 
hardly hears European farmers complain about China.  
 
Altogether, there is no doubt that reforms in China have, in and by themselves, helped to 
improve effective market access for EU exporters and investors, but the overall picture is mixed 
with good and bad experiences. Dialogues clearly play a role in this.  
5.1.4 Dialogues for increasing effective market access 
In a fragmented way, there are documented indications of the role of trade-related EU-China 
dialogues in the improvement of market access. We use quotations from two EU trade barrier 
reports to substantiate the point. In the 2013 report,32 on p. 6 the Commission writes that these 
“market access issues have been elevated to key priorities in the EU ’s bilateral trade relations” 
and it “has systematically raised them in all bilateral meetings, often up to the highest bilateral 
political level (e.g. summits)”. In the same report, there is a revealing section (pp. 16-17) on the 
value of diplomatic (e.g. non-legalistic) trade discussions, not unlike the typical Chinese 
appreciation of ‘relational’ approaches, in order to solve frictions or overcome market access 
barriers.  
Trade diplomacy is part of the EU’s coherent approach on external action. Trade 
diplomacy is usually the fastest way to tackle trade barriers as it does not require a 
specific context, as in the case of FTA negotiations or a long and complex litigation 
strategy as in the case of trade disputes. … [S]uch a way to address trade barriers is 
indeed a diplomatic tool as its objective is precisely to solve issues, suggesting that no 
party has to lose while the other wins. This avoids the risk of escalation in the disputes 
and retaliatory measures, legal or not. ... [T]he EU’s capacity to provide convincing 
alternative solutions, concrete proposals, ideally based on its own experience and the 
wealth of experience in its Member States and lessons-learnt. Regulatory cooperation 
or dialogues are a very useful tool to do so. 
In the 2018 barriers report33 (p. 15), there is a specific list of dialogues that have been 
instrumental in addressing market access questions with China:  
While the EU has used all avenues to address the challenges it faces with China, 
including bilateral dialogues (Economic and Trade Working Group, ICT Dialogue, Cyber 
Task Force, Trade and Investment Dialogue, High Level Economic Dialogue, summit) and 
multilateral fora (various WTO committees), the recent developments require additional, 
well-coordinated efforts to better address market access issues vis-a-vis China.  
 
32 European Commission (2013), Trade and Investment Barriers report 2013, COM(2013) 103, 28 February 
(http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/march/tradoc_150742.pdf). 
33 European Commission (2019), Report on Trade and Investment Barriers 2018, June (www.trade.ec.europa.eu/ 
doclib/docs/2019/june/tradoc_157929.pdf). 
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It is also interesting to observe (on p. 29) that bilateral dialogues34 sometimes do lead to issues 
being resolved, as for instance with SPS standards for cheese in China.  
5.2 Can the web of dialogues be seen as an ‘unbundled’ FTA’?  
Given the Annex and Figure 1 and the many examples mentioned, and given the many trade 
disciplines covered by the dialogues, one may ask the question of whether the web of (trade-
related) dialogues serves as an ‘unbundled’ FTA, without a formal treaty. Of course, the history 
of a number of trade-related dialogues goes back to the run-up of China’s WTO accession and 
thus the areas covered coincide with the WTO trade disciplines. There is also a legacy of the 
2007-11 negotiations on a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement35 between the EU and 
China, which failed but amounted to an exercise almost similar to FTA talks. The notion of an 
unbundled FTA is not as strange as it might sound.36 A modern FTA usually has a series of 
chapters covering very similar grounds as the EU-China dialogues do, quite a few of which are 
initially moulded after the trade areas covered by the various WTO agreements China acceded 
to. In addition, it is good to remember that in 2014 and 2015 the EU-China summit declared 
the willingness to envisage a deep and comprehensive FTA as a longer-term perspective when 
conditions are right. This might be read as a judgment that the dialogues can support a good 
deal of the technical preparation of such a major undertaking. On the other hand, the number 
of EU-China dialogues has increased, organically, over the years – reflecting the closer bilateral 
relations over a broad spectrum of policy areas.  
However, this view suffers from two severe shortcomings. Dialogues are too often 
uncoordinated, even when properly within the competence of respective EU institutions. They 
are also frequently ‘bottom-up’, unlike in an FTA strategy. At the same time, the modern EU 
FTAs nowadays are ‘deep and comprehensive’, which means that a good deal of their substance 
is ‘regulatory’. It so happens that most issues in the trade-related dialogues are regulatory in 
nature, too, simply because a good deal of the initial architecture of dialogues was modelled 
after the various subject matters of WTO agreements and – later – the intended Partnership 
and Cooperation Agreement. What is difficult to assess from afar (and from what is publicly 
known) is whether and how much today’s regulatory EU-China dialogues are actually capable 
of improving EU companies’ market access for goods and services in China (see also 5.2 below). 
 
34 The text says “[a]fter the issue has been raised by the EU in different bilateral meetings”, which are most likely to 
be one or more dialogues. Unfortunately, in the 2019 report, no efforts traceable to dialogues can be found, although 
China is prominent in the report. Cf www.trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2020/june/tradoc_158789.pdf. 
35 Such partnership and cooperation agreements can be stand-alone agreements with EU partner countries but 
are also frequently a side pillar to an FTA concluded between the EU and the trading partner. In the case of China, 
the idea was to have no fewer than 22 chapters, many of which would cover aspects of trade relations that can 
routinely be found in EU FTAs.  
36 There is one example of FTAs concluded without a formal treaty, by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN). ASEAN is itself an FTA and therefore has no common trade policy. Nevertheless, it managed to conclude 
(umbrella) FTAs with Japan, China, Korea and some other partners, underpinned by official FTAs on a country-by-
country basis. The EU and ASEAN have expressed a preference to (eventually) conclude an FTA, which would 
somehow be underpinned by EU FTAs with most ASEAN countries.  
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Therefore, we are unsure but rather doubtful about whether the web of dialogues serves as an 
unbundled or fragmented FTA piece-by-piece, without a treaty.  
5.3 Can the dialogues stimulate ‘sustainable development’? 
The short answer is that they do, ever since 1994 for energy and shortly thereafter for the 
environment, and subsequently for labour and the climate. In other words, as sustainable 
development is a very important and comprehensive non-trade policy objective, EU trade 
policy in a wider sense exerts a positive influence on such objectives in China.  
The overriding rationale for this ‘effectiveness’ is found in the gradual process of convergence 
of China and the EU’s strategic objectives in this enormous domain. Chinese policy preferences 
and objectives gradually converging with the EU ones has made China susceptible and actively 
interested in constructive debates on reforms, mimicking the EU’s best practices where 
possible. For the same reason, China has been keen to participate in a host of practical and 
administrative programmes related to aspects of sustainable development. There are 
essentially four areas that, together, make up sustainable development and China has shown 
active interest in all four. China has improved its occupational health and safety laws (there is 
an EU-China dialogue on this topic). In terms of labour rights (sometimes referred to as 
international labour standards),37 China today adheres to six out of eight core conventions of 
the International Labour Organization (ILO) (not those on freedom of association or on 
collective bargaining). It has also improved and tightened over time its environmental laws and 
enforcement, for instance on chemical pollution as well as other air quality issues,38 landfill 
issues, soil protection (with EU member states), waste treatment, upgraded water quality and 
e.g. plastics. China has been involved in climate issues for decades and ratified the Kyoto 
protocol (but assumed modest obligations at first as a – then – developing country). The 2015 
Paris Agreement was of course a truly global effort, but China and the EU have been working 
closely together to achieve this significant result.  
Two RESPECT papers on dialogues between the EU and China on sustainable development are 
forthcoming: one on labour and related social questions (Hu & Pelkmans, 2020), and one on 
environmental and climate policies (Pelkmans, 2020) for which the bilateral cooperation on 
sustainable forestry and timber trade is highlighted in Box 6. The former includes an analysis of 
the convergence of occupational health & safety over time through dialogues and related 
programmes, as well as China’s adherence to ILO core conventions and the policy ideas behind 
it, including the ILO decent work agenda. In addition, there will be a lengthy analysis of social 
protection in China in the period around 1995 until 2020. The latter paper surveys the process 
 
37 Although these are regulations once incorporated into national law rather than standards, which are by 
definition voluntary.  
38 It took China a long time before it finally began to force SO2 emissions downward (high SO2 emissions caused a 
lot of hardship and disease, as well as acid rain in and beyond China). However, here China did not follow the EU 
example of restricting these emissions at source – capping the use of coal severely, for example. China kept on 
increasing coal use and installed end-of-pipe technology (desulphurisation filters), which has limited potential.  
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of convergence in the fields of the environment and climate, with detailed attention on the 
starting position of China in the mid-1990s, when its growth was pursued ‘at all costs’, followed 
by a careful inspection of policy developments and indicators with respect to the environment 
and climate mitigation until 2020.  
Box 6. EU-China cooperation on sustainable forestry and timber trade 
The EU is a net importer of wood, certainly tropical hardwood. It has long been promoting 
sustainable forestry for tropical woods, for environmental and climate reasons but also for 
ensuring a reliable international framework enabling the import of sustainability-certified 
hardwood into the EU. This is the motive of the EU FLEGT39 initiative concluded with several 
ASEAN countries as well as some African ones. China is the largest wood importer from 
ASEAN and increasingly from Africa as well. The 2009 bilateral cooperation mechanism with 
China on FLEG initially focused on China’s own laws (given its 1998 restrictions on harvesting 
wood domestically and the tightening later) and practices but quickly widened to encompass 
the trading aspects as well. Using FLEGT in Indonesia (the leading FLEGT country) or ASEAN 
at large is probably pointless without involving China as the biggest importer. China’s huge 
timber & pulp imports in 2017 amounted to $51 bn; it used to be a formidable exporter as 
well but it has lost a third of its sales abroad since 2007. In 2019, there were 15 FLEGT 
voluntary partnership agreement (VPA) countries that have minimum regulation and 
certification requirements as a condition for exporting to the EU. This has acted as a standard 
for quite a few countries and stimulated China to act in a similar fashion. How important this 
all is can be seen if one knows that Chinese timber imports from FLEGT VPA countries 
between 2007 and 2017 increased by 136% in US$ value. On the export side, some 52% of 
Chinese exports of timber products were bound for regulated markets, i.e. only demonstrably 
legal timber can be imported.  
During the 9th meeting of the Bilateral Coordination Mechanism in March 2018, a workplan 
was adopted with a host of issues or options to address this question, such as import-
management structures, the development of the Chinese Timber Legality Verification 
System, a new monitoring system with guidelines and more incentives for the private sector 
to adopt responsible purchasing of forestry products. Meanwhile, China has amended its 
forestry law in 2020 prohibiting the purchase, transport and processing of illegal wood. The 
EU, China and Indonesia have developed a trialogue with respect to FLEGT and VPAs, whereas 
Vietnam-China and Myanmar-China talks have begun (inspired by FLEGT and stimulated by 




39 FLEG stands for forest law enforcement and governance. With the trade component in, it becomes FLEGT. 
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For present purposes we limit ourselves to illustrations of the recent dialogue process and 
substance. Current dialogue work on energy is based on the China-EU Roadmap on Energy 
Cooperation for 2016-20.40 This roadmap goes surprisingly far, even including harmonisation. 
On energy supply, it seeks to reduce costs by ‘improving competition’ via trade and investment. 
This intriguing policy intention between the EU and China ought to be investigated empirically 
now that the four-year Roadmap is over.41 On energy demand and efficiency, the Roadmap is 
ambitious. It suggests mutual recognition of existing and future schemes, harmonising energy 
labels and going for market-oriented energy-performance contracting. Again, this asks for 
further research and clarification.  
On cross-cutting issues, three aspects seem equally ambitious. First, the Roadmap speaks of 
harmonising regulatory ‘grid’ policies, which seems very ambitious indeed. Second, the 
partners advocate the promotion of markets for ‘green goods’. Here, as a member of the Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), China has supported a ‘green goods’ plurilateral 
agreement in the WTO (a follow-up of APEC’s green goods arrangement) and so has the EU but 
these negotiations are currently stuck.42 Promoting domestic markets for green goods might 
be a reason for mutual emulation but this would need to be analysed further. Third, and 
somewhat surprisingly, the roadmap seeks cooperation within the framework of the Energy 
Charter, so far a legal framework with EU-like rules for a much wider European area. The 
(economic and trade) meaning of this intention and the possible link with the Belt and Road 
Initiative will have to be addressed in further work. One possible, suggested reason behind this 
close cooperation is the long-run strategy of the large electricity companies in China (the largest 
in the world and all SOEs) vis-à-vis Europe, envisaging takeovers and tighter connectivity 
between the two electricity systems.  
The joint EU-China political leaders’ declaration in Beijing43 of 2018 suggests further deepening 
relations on climate change and clean energy. In the declaration, and confirming an earlier 
point, the partners step up their bilateral cooperation for implementing the Paris Agreement, 
including the international cooperation to this effect. It also enhances technical, economic and 
scientific cooperation while explicitly involving the European Investment Bank. Leaders reaffirm 
their strong commitment to the $100 bn climate fund for developing countries and new funding 
after 2025. They express support for the Kigali amendment (of the Montreal treaty on 
hydrofluorocarbons) and pledge to jointly phase out harmful heating, fridges and air-
conditioning liquids. Finally, China is now unambiguously committed to lowering emissions in 
air and maritime transport, which has long been a controversial issue.  
 
40 See the “EU-China Roadmap on energy cooperation (2016-2020)”, European Union and Government of the PRC 
(https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/FINAL_EU_CHINA_ENERGY_ROADMAP_EN.pdf). 
41 Note that the roadmap also includes a range of highly specific items on supply.  
42 See de Melo & Solleder (2019) for a detailed analysis of the complications of the green goods plurilateral.  
43 See the “EU-China leaders’ statement on climate change and clean energy”, Beijing, 16 July 2018 
(https://ec.europa.eu/clima/files/news/20180713_statement_en.pdf). 
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With respect to the social pillar of sustainable development, the employment and social policies 
dialogue began in 2005. A major technical project44 through which China wanted to acquire 
knowledge and tap the experiences of EU member states (social security is not an EU 
competence) began in 2006 for four years, and this project was undertaken by the Chinese 
administration in Beijing. The dialogue on occupational health and safety was initiated in 2009, 
soon followed by a special project on this topic in high-risk sectors. Starting in 2014, the EU-
China project on social protection reform ran to 2019, with a follow-up – together with the ILO 
– on “Improving China’s institutional capacity towards universal social protection” until 2022. 
Under the 2013-20 EU-China strategic agenda for cooperation, the part on ‘social progress’ 
indicates a series of initiatives connected to social protection and cohesion.  
This short description of EU-China dialogues and programmes on sustainable development 
makes it very clear that i) the gradual convergence is real and goes quite far; and ii) it has led 
to concrete and significant policy implications for both economies as well as for international 
cooperation. Since sustainable development has become a major trade and investment issue, 
these policy commitments support the premise that non-trade policy objectives can be and are 
supported by the EU’s trade and investment policy, and, in this area, to amazing degrees. 
However, one has to assess this conclusion properly, because it hinges on two critical aspects: 
the gradual convergence over time of the objectives of the two partners, and a rather long 
period (here, some 25 years) in order to avoid studying merely a few ‘trees’ of the forest and 
the risk, as well, of missing out on China’s long-run approaches.  
It is at least doubtful whether the long-run rapprochement in climate and environmental 
policies, and to a considerable extent also in social protection and most of the labour standards, 
would have gone so far, had the overall long-run objectives not been converging over time. It 
can therefore be maintained that the relative effectiveness of these specific dialogues over 
decades is a function of the more fundamental process of convergence in these two pillars of 
sustainable development. Farnell & Crookes (2016) are more sceptical for the majority of 
dialogues, without specifying them in this quote:  
While the broad scope of discussion may be defined, there is often no specific goal, 
except to contribute to mutual understanding... In most cases, there is no oversight of 
the discussions at the political level, no timetable for results and no sense of urgency 
to make progress. 
This sweeping statement is surely much too general as we show for the environment and 
climate as well as for the (generally more sensitive) social pillar of sustainable development. 
Although Farnell & Crookes (op. cit.), acknowledge ‘practical objectives’ in some policy areas 
and provide a few precise examples45 as well as a short overview of considerable funding for 
articulated programmes, their view is that these are the exceptions. Following a few case 
studies on energy, the environment, climate and urbanisation (often linked to those), their 
 
44 The EU-China social security reform cooperation project. 
45 Such as on standards for electric vehicles and specific issues in customs procedures. 
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conclusions are sombre. That is not to say that little seems to happen; extensive networking 
occurs, but cooperation is rarely ‘deep’ and mutual. “In general, ... the exchanges are limited 
to government officials … hardly business, and when it does the result has been judged 
insufficient by the European side”(p. 187). Influence on policy “is one-way, from the EU to 
China… .The benefits of EU-China cooperation for the real economy … appear to be very 
limited” (p. 188).  
It is good to be warned by Farnell & Crookes not to read too much in frantic dialogue activities 
and networking. But there is substantial evidence that more than two decades have not been 
without explicit and tangible rapprochement in, e.g. climate mitigation and the environment. 
That notwithstanding, in China there is often a long period from public announcements to 
concrete policy implementation and that is certainly the case with sustainable development. 
Moreover, Farnell & Crookes had finished their book just before the Paris Agreement on 
Climate Change and before the enactment of the three paramount and much firmer 
environmental laws on air, soil and water in China (with respect to 2015, 2016 and 2018, see 
Pelkmans (2020) for detail). Additionally, in the social field it can be shown that China has 
looked to the EU for inspiration and experience, with the EU eager to witness social progress in 
China. There are also signs that the time horizon of Farnell & Crookes might be too short, 
something that we have attempted to avoid to the extent feasible by covering up to 25 years 
of the cooperation.  
5.4 Can dialogues address ‘systemic’ differences’?  
China boasts about its ‘socialist market economy with Chinese characteristics’. When the EU 
and China look back on some 25 years of bilateral dialogues on market orientation, market 
opening for trade and investment, various forms of close cooperation and many aspects of 
reforms in China, an inevitable query comes up: should the focus on numerous ‘trees’ (i.e. the 
many dialogues) be preceded by a well-founded view of the ‘forest’ (what about the Chinese 
system of a socialist market economy underlying many bilateral policy issues and, indeed, many 
problems in the WTO)? A significant and complicating factor is that neither China nor any other 
country with a ‘socialist’ ideology46 is a democracy with recognised and legally protected 
freedom of speech and information (or indeed research) – that is, open, well-informed and 
unrestricted debate – as well as social and political rights of association. This mere fact renders 
it a priori most unlikely that fundamental systemic differences can be fruitfully discussed in 
earnest, even when diplomatic accommodation in informal and closed settings might take 
place.  
From the literature it is clear that, several decades ago, many countries or leading politicians in 
several parts of the world might have entertained expectations of a gradual change of China’s 
socialist market economy, in which case the EU (as well as the US, separately) also had a 
cooperation programme on governance for village suffrage, for example, with some of them 
 
46 Take Vietnam, Cuba and North Korea, for example. 
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believing in an eventual shift to a multiparty system with greater social and political freedoms. 
By now, these expectations and erstwhile beliefs have been eroded if not eliminated. If this is 
correct, the query becomes whether informal but frank and fact-based discussions in bilateral 
dialogues can address systemic differences of socio-political tenets underlying the socialist 
market economy. The short answer is no. Such initiatives would be regarded, inevitably, as 
attempts at regime change and hence be taboo. Diplomatic parlance would have it that this 
would be an unacceptable interference in domestic affairs. It would furthermore undermine 
the spirit of the strategic partnership currently upheld firmly by China and the EU, despite 
occasional frictions. Some in China even suggest informally that the EU would resist, equally 
categorically, any attempts by China to discuss a reversal of democracy and of a relatively non-
interventionist economy, even though China’s doctrine has it that democracies exhibit 
fundamental weaknesses and markets require far more steering by direct government 
instruments, including a major role for SOEs.  
In this respect, it is worth quoting the work of Max Roger Taylor (2019), another rare book47 in 
which numerous interviews with officials involved in EU-China cooperation lay at the basis of 
the conclusions. For present purposes, when addressing systemic trade issues derived from the 
socialist market economy with Chinese characteristics, his three negative48 hypotheses about 
promoting EU values with China should be considered: 
a) Raising the most EU controversial values with China is expected to trigger an 
obstructive response by the Chinese side which will critically undermine 
dialogues. 
b) Value mainstreaming is pointless as well as risky, as Chinese interlocutors are 
perceived likely to be unable to meaningfully impact Chinese policy 
connected to EU controversial values. 
c) [There is a] perception among EU officials that China is not listening to [the] 
EU and it should.  
All three hypotheses are frequently heard in conversations. They might as well apply to the 
discourse about the systemic trade issues of the socialist market economy with Chinese 
characteristics.  
The fundamental query is therefore a derived one: can systemic differences be addressed in 
the framework of bilateral and multilateral trade and investment rules, and accepted world 
practices? The economic case for such actions must rest on the extent and gravity of distortions 
and the potential or actual negative spillovers engendered. What renders it so problematic is 
that ‘extent and gravity’ as well as negative cross-border spillover are far from easy to establish 
firmly. Many other countries intervene in multiple ways in their markets, which implies that it 
is a tall order to distinguish ‘systemic’ from other interventions. For the WTO it is known that, 
 
47 It is a Ph.D. dissertation at the University of Bath. 
48 He also puts forward two positive hypotheses. See Taylor (2019, p. 280, table 10.1). 
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to some extent and for some forms of interventionism and controls, specific distortions can be 
addressed, whereas for other ‘distortions’ this is either doubtful, given the gaps and omissions 
in the rules and rulings of the Appellate Body, or as yet impossible. So far, the filing of WTO 
cases by both China and the EU (also outside the trade defence area) has not undermined the 
spirit of the strategic partnership.  
Nineteen years after WTO accession, it is a fair judgment that China is (roughly) WTO compliant 
where legal texts in the WTO are clear and straightforward (see, e.g. Grieger, 2016, and the 
literature quoted). There are surely some outstanding compliance issues, and one particularly 
serious example is industrial subsidies.49 About fisheries subsidies there is very little clarity. It 
would seem to be a different matter altogether where the implicit assumption (of original 
participants in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and members of today’s WTO) that 
trading partners are market economies is less than properly incorporated in the written rules, 
or not at all, or where actual implementation or enforcement of accepted WTO disciplines is 
weak or literally failing. Even a relatively simple discipline such as careful and timely notification 
of, e.g. subsidies, in various forms has been followed up in lax ways or not at all in forms useful 
for trade policy. That is the case not only for China50 but holds in particular for China because 
there are powerful indications that distortions occur and are aggravated because of its sheer 
size in the world economy. Recently, there has been much more explicit attention on such 
omissions and the de facto circumvention of what market economies typically regard as routine 
market disciplines. Moreover, there are non-trivial signals that under President Xi, the systemic 
differences have widened.  
It is not publicly known how the EU-China dialogues at the top level have dealt with the forest 
of systemic differences relevant for trade and investment. What is known is that the EU has 
insisted that China should pursue a broad economic reform route for markets to work better, 
and that it supported the rich November 2013 Chinese Communist Party (CCP) reform plans as 
a manifestation of this approach. However, when it became clear that these reform plans 
turned out to be a paper tiger, the concerns of China’s trading partners including the EU increased 
exponentially, not least because China had meanwhile initiated radical and interventionist plans 
for many business sectors, with apparently massive funding in ingenious ways.  
The present report is not the place to set out these concerns in analytical detail,51 but the 
upshot has been a new China strategy for the EU since March 2019.52 Dubbing it a ‘new’ 
strategy is not correct as the main elements have been adopted from the 2016 strategy, but 
there is no doubt that the wording and style are far more assertive than hitherto. This newly 
formulated strategy and several important WTO cases touching on some of the suspected 
 
49 See Hu (2019b) on industrial subsidies; see also the WTO’s “Trade Policy Review: China” (2018), at p. 17.  
50 However, just to select one prominent example, India has carefully complied with the obligations to report on 
subsidies in the WTO. 
51 See Pelkmans (2018) for an elaboration; see also EPSC (2019), Heilmann (2018) and Zenglein & Holzmann (2019) 
(https://www.merics.org/en/papers-on-china/evolving-made-in-china-2025). 
52 See EU-China – A strategic outlook, JOIN(2019) 5 final, Strasbourg, 12 March 2019, op. cit. 
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distortions at stake, not to speak of the U-turn of the US administration led by President Trump, 
have made China realise that it has to respond to these pressures by further opening up (be it 
selectively once again), accelerating the CAI talks by setting an end date and working together 
with the EU in a bilateral dialogue on WTO reform.53  
The EU has also responded with the introduction of an EU framework of investment screening 
as a basis for possible restrictions for reasons of national security and public order (but a 
somewhat wider concept of security). This screening is more a ‘sign on the wall’ than a very 
restrictive tool but it is a credible signal that the EU has become vigilant about incoming FDI. 
The same approach applies to some EU member states, such as Germany. Also, the 
Commission’s 2020 white paper on foreign subsidies affecting economic activity in the EU single 
market reflects concerns about systemic issues vis-à-vis China, even when China is not singled 
out as such.  
For the EU, the ‘socialist market economy with Chinese characteristics’ has certain tenets 
negatively affecting trade and investment in bilateral and multilateral ways:  
• the many methods (often hidden or non-transparent) and sheer quantities of subsidies, 
including more than 1,700 heavily state-influenced investment funds;  
• the steering and direct influence of the state on SOEs, and these SOEs are often giant 
firms, in sectoral markets dominated by them, and/or they largely control leading R&D 
subsidies and programmes (if not research institutes and laboratories) in what are 
called industries of the future. Unlike in the EU for example, SOEs are not embedded in 
an overall pro-market regime, with strict transparency rules about the financial 
relations between the state and the companies, along with prohibitions or conditioning 
of state aid; 
• the ever-increasing direct role of the Party (CCP) in firms, and not only SOEs but also in 
more than 200,000 private Chinese companies. Usually, the CCP representative sits on 
the board; this phenomenon is unknown in any other WTO partner (as far as we know). 
There is nothing ‘Chinese’ about this characteristic – it is Party control for motives other 
than market-led ones. The newest target of this highly intrusive CCP attempt to control 
or steer companies in what is supposed to be a market economy are foreign enterprises 
in China. This began in 2017, in particular for joint ventures of foreign enterprises with 
local SOEs. In September 2020, however, a much broader approach has been assumed 
by the CCP, applying to foreign firms as well, which has raised serious concerns with the 
foreign business community in China;54 
 
53 Of course, concluding the Phase 1 Economic and Trade Agreement with the US (January 2020) is another step 
taken by China to open up.  
54 See the press release of the European Chamber dated 12 October 2020 (https://europeanchamber.com.cn/ 
en/press-releases/3291/european_chamber_stance_on_united_front_work_in_china_s_private_sector). Among 
 
CAN DIALOGUES ADVANCE EU-CHINA TRADE RELATIONS? | 25 
 
• condoned or forced technology transfer when a foreign company wants to invest in 
China. Given the enormous market size of China, also rapidly growing, this ‘soft’ 
instrument can be quite effective, because the only alternative for firms is to quit China, 
which is often even less attractive;  
• widespread restrictions on incoming FDI and often highly discretionary treatment 
(under licensing regimes) rather than mere general rules. China also steers or even 
controls outward FDI, which – for a country with huge foreign exchange reserves – 
cannot be explained by balance of payment considerations; managing outward FDI is 
alien to a market economy; and 
• a number of dubious or unusual interventions that China maintains in goods trade, 
including VAT exemptions and a battery of export restrictions. 
That said, a socialist market economy with Chinese characteristics per se need not be a problem 
for market access. A ‘marriage of convenience’ no doubt, China innovatively coined the term 
to accommodate two opposing ideologies, i.e. the legitimacy of one-party Communism in the 
country and a market-driven model of development with private property rights, in order to 
qualify for membership at the WTO, which is in effect only for market economies. The principal 
issue with the socialist market economy with Chinese characteristics is the Chinese 
government’s continued role in influencing the markets, which is also incompatible with its 
WTO commitments.55 Practically all these issues can be addressed in EU-China dialogues but 
there seems to be little public information on whether they are and whether that leads to fewer 
interventions. One effect recently is that systemic differences are widely debated in many 
capitals in the world, not least in Geneva and Brussels. Unfortunately, the EU-China WTO 
reform working group has not published its deliberations.  
6. Conclusions  
EU-China dialogues fulfil many useful functions and a large majority of some 50 or so of these 
dialogues is directly or indirectly relevant for trade and investment. Today’s architecture of the 
EU-China dialogues can be traced back to the following rationales: 
i) early development needs and requests for policy learning, which China (and 
international organisations) expressed decades ago;  
ii) some first dialogues linked to the 1985 EU-China non-preferential trade agreement; 
iii) preparation for China’s accession to the WTO – when the EU offered capacity building 
and support programmes, with in-depth exchanges in the many areas of the WTO; and  
 
the 28 clauses in the opinions, a striking one is clause no. 8, where it says that the CCP seeks to develop “a 
backbone of private businesspeople that can be relied on at critical moments”. This statement is a plain distortion 
in and by itself because CCP allegiance, instead of market principles and incentives, matters most.  
55 See Hu (2019b) on industrial subsidies; see also Hu (2019a) on China as a WTO developing member.  
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iv) the persistent urge on both sides for China to reform deeply and structurally as China 
migrated out of the top-down and rigidly planned economy (without much private 
economic initiative allowed) towards a market economy.  
Today, the underlying rationale for having so many trade-relevant dialogues is that modern 
trade and investment policy covers a very broad spectrum of policy areas. Moreover, there are 
permanent and emerging issues to address jointly in the world economy and at the same time 
new opportunities to enhance job growth via increased trade and direct investment. This wide 
range is also reflected in the proliferation of WTO agreements and new56 areas of attention.  
Within the EU, the recent assignment of a wide range of areas to EU trade policy, instead of 
the member states being competent, has certainly caused a further expansion of the scope of 
EU-China dialogues. This widening of the scope of EU-level trade policy began with the 1991 
opinion of the Court of Justice of the European Union, followed by its 2017 opinion on the 
legality of several aspects of the EU-Singapore FTA.57 A comparable widening of scope has been 
found in FTAs concluded58 by the EU and by several other OECD countries with both developed 
and developing countries. An important underlying reason for this broadening is ‘trading costs’ 
– the effective cost differential between bringing goods to the domestic and to a foreign market 
(apart from transport and insurance, which are inevitable).  
In the case of China, as mentioned above, the proliferation of dialogues has several 
explanations. In short, among them is the demand for wide-ranging consultation and mutual 
policy learning given the lack of an FTA for such an important trade and investment relationship, 
and (initially) the developmental and support needs of China in a series of technical fields. Most 
prominently is the powerful quest for socioeconomic and market reforms, which is expected 
to have a positive impact on market access as well as on the better functioning of the Chinese 
market (including a level playing field for foreign enterprises).  
The following conclusions on the role and functions of dialogues under the EU-China 
comprehensive and strategic partnership are based on a data search (Hu, 2020), which is 
unfortunately incomplete as the reporting on EU-China dialogues by the two sides is neither 
centralised nor systematic, but scattered and very incomplete. Nevertheless, we believe the 
survey of the data is the best available so far. 
  
 
56 Although some are not so much new as better accepted in the global trade community (cf. the four so-called 
Singapore issues going back to EU proposals in 1996).  
57 Opinion 2/15 declares that the EU’s exclusive competence in trade does not cover just two aspects, namely the field 
of non-direct foreign investment (‘portfolio’ investments made without any intention to influence the management and 
control of an undertaking) and the regime governing dispute settlement between investors and states.  
58 In the case of Mexico, the FTA concluded in the late 1990s even had to be upgraded recently so as to 
accommodate the policy demand for widening the scope and deepening of commitments.  
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We asked four specific questions, after first mapping the EU-China dialogues.  
1) Do dialogues improve market access? 
Dialogues would seem to have facilitated market access in a variety of ways: helping 
Chinese laws to align with WTO laws, supporting the delivery of specific WTO 
commitments, strengthening enforcement by China (including technical controls), 
stimulating its opening-up in specific fields (like air transport and maritime) and 
assisting China to level the playing field internally, which is also helpful for EU 
companies in China.  
However, when it comes to classic tariff setting, China is unilateral (under bound 
tariffs). In trade defence there have been two dialogues (one on trade defence 
instrument (TDI) best practices and one on market economy status), but the EU has 
only further increased its TDI restrictions vis-à-vis China. Thus, these two dialogues 
might have accomplished little more than letting off steam by complaining.  
The EU has also consistently insisted on reforms in China with a view to easing 
restrictions that hinder effective market access. On some aspects, this seems to have 
worked but not on the big issue of SOEs and their privileges. We show that SOEs under 
President Xi have rapidly gained prominence and support, even at the expense of 
private firms. Moreover, the factual application of the Anti-Monopoly Law (inspired by 
EU law) to SOEs, and in particular to mergers between large SOEs, is plainly 
anticompetitive. Market access and post-establishment liberalisation for EU FDI under 
‘national treatment’ is a key subject of the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment 
and is of course a negotiation for a treaty, not a dialogue matter. On forced technology 
transfer, dialogues failed to work and the EU eventually settled for filing a WTO case, 
similar to the US and Japan. On intellectual property rights, however, dialogues and 
follow-up programmes have been quite successful – the remaining (serious) problem 
is enforcement. For geographical indications, a seven-year negotiation resulted in an 
EU-China agreement in 2019, with 100 GIs on both sides to begin with. On technical 
standardisation, the partners still have a dialogue on technical barriers to trade, along 
with a cooperation initiative that has been launched among three European 
standardisation bodies, based in Beijing.  
Finally, since reporting of these dialogues is always couched in diplomatic language, 
we attempted to find traces in EU reports confirming these uses of dialogues. This led 
to a few revealing quotes on how dialogues matter in this respect and an admission 
that dialogues might often be more practical and less controversial than a legalistic 
approach in the framework of an FTA.  
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2) Can the web of dialogues be seen as an unbundled FTA? 
The answer is not really. An FTA is no longer a short-run objective for either partner 
and the EU’s two prerequisites for starting FTA talks have not been fulfilled: concluding 
the CAI and deep reforms in China (bound to include a different approach to SOEs). 
Building up an unbundled FTA through numerous dialogues on areas nowadays often 
included in deep and comprehensive FTAs requires refined coordination on both sides 
and this is absent. A lot of dialogues are bottom-up, fairly loose and non-committal, 
and basically not coordinated horizontally. Their links with the annual summit are 
usually ‘vertical’ by pleading the importance of the initiative or the field, not so much 
by the overall longer-term frameworks. The trade dialogues do not seem to substitute, 
even imperfectly, for an FTA, though the dialogue subjects coincide with a number of 
typical FTA chapters. Indeed, an eventual future FTA may be – in part – conveniently 
drafted based on some of the dialogues.  
3) Can the dialogues stimulate sustainable development? 
In sustainable development (including adherence to six of the eight ILO core 
conventions, though the last two are the most crucial), a considerable degree of recent 
convergence of EU and Chinese objectives has been extremely helpful for effective 
bilateral cooperation for both the social dialogues (labour standards and social 
protection) and the environmental & climate dialogues. The EU and China have 
worked together for two or more decades on a myriad of projects, programmes, 
dialogues, declarations (also through the summits) and via special funding. Thus, in 
recent energy cooperation the bilateral collaboration goes remarkably far, including 
even harmonising in selected areas. In climate strategies the EU and China have 
recently come to work closely together, but also did so in the heyday of the Clean 
Development Mechanism. On other aspects of the environment, after a history of 
dreadful neglect and indifference in China, with adverse public health consequences 
as well, the partners have cooperated in a number of different ways to achieve results, 
such as better (for instance, risk-based) regulation and more effective enforcement. 
The non-trade policy objectives under sustainable development have been supported 
actively by the EU, with continued interest from China, and occasionally with 
cooperation on the ground in China (e.g. with the cap-and-trade system).  
4) Can dialogues reconcile or at least mitigate ‘systemic’ differences? 
In the case of systemic differences, dialogues have not proven to be very useful in 
terms of results, if indeed this can be expected at all from dialogues. It is an 
accomplishment to keep channels of debate and exchange open. From the EU end, 
dealing with systemic differences effectively when the partner country takes pride in 
enjoying a socialist market economy with Chinese characteristics is intrinsically 
impossible. This question is so fundamental, if not existential given the overwhelming 
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and highly intrusive role of the CCP, that one can only hope to work on the 
incompatibilities with the WTO and the experienced negative spill overs from the 
massive interventionism in China. Dialogues here have been concrete on some issues 
(e.g. steel and the Global Forum on Steel; innovation in light of the China 
manufacturing 2025 programme) and ever-more firmly linked with WTO reform 
(indeed, a bilateral dialogue on this theme is ongoing), while at the same time WTO 
cases have been filed or joined by the EU. These features are reflected in the EU’s 
China strategy of March 2019, in which China is regarded as a partner and a 
competitor, as well as a rival.  
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Annex. EU-China dialogue architecture and hierarchy 
 
 
                           
             
          
 
 
Political pillar Economic & sectoral pillar  People-to-people dialogue 
High Level Strategic 
Dialogue 
High Level Economic & 
 Trade Dialogue 
High Level People-to-People 
Dialogue 
EU-China Summit (annual) 
Parallel Dialogues with: 
- Eur. Economic & Social 
Comm (pillars 2 & 3) 
- European Parliament (all 3 
pillars) 
- ECB plus Euro Group & COM, 
with People’s Bank of China, 
NDRC and Finance Minister 
(pillar 2) 
3 Dialogues 
- Higher education 
- Cultural affairs 
- Youth affairs (+ Sports) 
In total, 50 Dialogues,  
Partnerships, working groups, e.g. 
- Macroeconomic 
- Trade & investment 
- Economic & financial 
- Development 
- Transport (aviation; rail) 
- Competition policy 




- Climate change partnership 
- A series of specialized trade-related 
subjects (e.g. IPRs, procurement, trade, 
defence, customs, etc.) 
- Regulatory trade subjects (e.g. consumer 
product safety; occup. H &S; animal health; 
telecoms / ICT; pharma & medical devices) 
- High Level Dialogue on Innovation 
Cooperation 
- High-tech sectors (e.g. space) 
- Science & Technology 
- Urbanisation 
- Legal (e.g. rule of law) 
- Smart City 
- Low Carbon Economy 
- SME Policy Dialogue 
- State-aids control 
- High-level dialogue on Circular Economy 
- Market Status (WG) 
- Fisheries (High Level Dialogue) 
- Ocean Affairs (High-level dial.) 
- Blue Partnership for the Oceans 
- BCM on FLEG (sustainable forestry & 
trade) 
- High level Dialogue on law of the Sea / 
Polar affairs 
- EU-China WG on IUU 
- Sustainable Tourism 
EU-China Dialogue Architecture & Hierarchy 
In total, 11 Dialogues, e.g. 
- Human rights 
- 5 regions (e.g. 
Central Asia, Africa) 
- Security; non-
proliferation 
Various contacts at 




Source: “EU-China Dialogue Architecture”, 
European External Action Service, 
November (2015) and authors’ compilation. 
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